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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
!\!ORTON INTERNATIONAL,
INC., a corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, a corporation,

Case No.
12557

Defend ant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Morton International, Inc. (referred to herein as
"Morton"), is a producer of salt from Great Salt Lake,
and sued Southern Pacific Transportation Company (referred to herein as "Southern Pacific") for damages and
injunctive relief to remedy the injury to it from Southern
Pacific's construction of a causeway across the Lake
which has caused and is causing a progressive loss of
dissolved sodium chloride from the waters of the south
portion of the Lake.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Southern Pacific's motion for summary judgment
was granted by the lower court following oral argument,
and judgment in Southern Pacific's favor was entered
May 25, 1971.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Morton seeks reversal of the summary judgment
and the remand of the case to the lower court for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appeal record consists of the pleadings, discovery materials, memoranda submitted by the parties,
and a transcript of the oral arguments made to the trial
court at the hearing on Southern Pacific's motion for
summary judgment. As the lower court granted summary judgment on a motion, there is no transcript of a
trial. In the statement of facts which follows, the facts
pleaded in the complaint are taken as true, in accordance with the normal rule.
Morton produces salt by diverting water from the
Great Salt Lake onto its lands and plant which are
located near Saltair, Utah, at the south end of the Lake
( R 185). The plant represents an investment of several
million dollars ( R 2) . Morton's predecessors produced
salt at the same location at least as early as 1888 ( R 198).
After diverting the lake water onto its lands, Morton
produces salt by moving the Lake brines to a system
of ponds where, by solar evaporation, the brines reach
a state of sodium chloride saturation; the saturated brine
is then moved to a precipitation pond, where the sodium
chloride precipitates out; the remaining water is then
returned to the Lake ( R 6). The precipitated salt is
later harvested from the floor of the precipitation pond,
refined and shipped ( R 6).
:Morton entered into an agreement with the State of
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Utah, dated September 17, 1954, in which the parties
agreed that Morton would have the continuing right to
appropriate, remove and divert Lake waters and extract
salt from the Lake, Morton agreeing to pay a minimum
royalty annually in advance, and to pay a production
royalty computed at the rate of 10¢ per ton of salt
shipped, to be remitted quarterly. The agreement states
a twenty-year term. Rule 26 of the State Land Board
provides that the agreement may be amended so as to
incorporate the provisions of the standard form, which,
in turn, provides that such standard agreement shall continue for a period of fifteen years and for such additional
period thereafter as production continues and royalties
are paid (R 274-275). Thus, under these provisions
Morton may continue to operate at this location so long
as it produces salt there and pays the required royalties.
As of April 23, 1971, Morton had remitted royalties of
about $240,000 to the State under the agreement, all of
which have been accepted by the State (R 301) ; current
royalty payments are also being paid and accepted (R
301). Morton has not applied for nor does it have a certificate of water appropriation issued by the State Engineer ( R 204; 215) ; however, its predecessors in interest,
to whose rights Morton succeeded, diverted water from
the Great Salt Lake for the production of salt as early
as 1888 ( R 198).
In 1959 Southern Pacific completed the construction
of a causeway across Great Salt Lake, running east-andwest from Promontory Point to Lakeside ( R 2) , which has
the effect of dividing the Lake into separate but intercon-
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nected lakes, referred to herein as the "South Lake" and
the "North Lake" ( R 2) . Except for two fifteen foot
wide culverts, the causeway is solid earth- and rock-fill.
Approximately 90% of the Lake's inflow of fresh water
flows into the South Lake ( R 2). The elevation of the
South Lake is about one foot higher than the elevation
of the North Lake ( R 3) . There is a continuous migra·
tion of salt from the South Lake into the North Lake
with the result that the salt is precipitating out of solu·
tion onto the floor of the North Lake (R 3). While in
the past the normal circulation and mixing of Lake
waters had kept the sodium chloride density approxi·
mately uniform throughout the Lake ( R 2), since the
construction of the causeway, millions of tons of salt
have migrated, and are migrating each year from the
South Lake to the North Lake (R 3). This process is
continuing ( R 3). The diminution in the salinity of the
South Lake has caused damages to Morton in excess of
$1,000,000, and the condition is continuing and worsen·
mg (R 3).
I

Morton's complaint is framed in four counts: ( 1)
That under the Grant of Easement Southern Pacific
received from the State Land Board, it was a condition
thereof that Southern Pacific compensate owners and
lessees for damages resulting from the construction and
subsequent operation of the causeway, which condition
was imposed for the benefit of third parties, including
Morton, and with which Southern Pacific has not com·
plied; ( 2) That by virtue of the construction of the
causeway, Southern Pacific has wrongfully caused, and
is wrongfully causing, the taking, carrying away and
wasting of the salt in the brines of the Great Salt Lake,
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so as to interfere with Morton's salt extraction rights
in the Lake; ( 3) That the causeway is a private nuisance;
and ( 4) That the causeway adversely affects water quality, to the damage of Morton's water rights. Southern
Pacific's answer is, in effect, a general denial, and a plea
of bar by limitations.
The complaint was held valid as against Southern
Pacific's motion to dismiss (R 30). Thereafter, following
some discovery, Southern Pacific moved for a summary
judgment, memoranda were submitted by the parties
and, upon oral argument, Southern Pacific's motion was
granted and judgment in its favor was subsequently entered ( R 340-341 ) .
ISSUES PRESENTED

A. In support of its Motion for Summary Judg-

ment, Southern Pacific contended that the Royalty
Agreement does not give Morton any right to the salt
which would serve as a basis for the litigation because:
1. A statute (§65-1-15, Utah Code Annotated,
1953) states that before the State Land Board can issue
a royalty agreement it must determine that an application for the appropriation of water from the Great Salt
Lake has been filed with the State Engineer and is pending in his office. Morton has filed no such application,
and therefore the agreement is void.

2. The Royalty Agreement provides that Morton
shall comply with the provisions of the Utah Water
Statutes relative to applications for the diversion and
appropriation of the waters of the State of Utah, "where
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said statutes are applicable." Because Morton has not
filed an application for appropriation of water, Morton
is in default under the contract and has been advised
of that default by the state by virtue of a counterclaim
filed in a suit entitled Alorton International, Inc. v. State
of Utah now pending in the U. S. District Court for the
District of Utah.
3. The Royalty Agreement merely grants to Mor·
ton a "license" to extract salt from the Great Salt Lake
and since Morton is only a "licensee," it has no right of
action against Southern Pacific.
4. The statute authorizing the State Land Board
to enter into royalty agreements covering minerals in the
Great Salt Lake (§65-1-15, U.C.A., 1953) expressly
states that all such royalty agreements shall be subject
to the "use of the waters [of the lake] for public pur·
poses" and since the Southern Pacific is a public utility
and has been granted an easement for the construction
of its causeway, the construction is such a public pur·
pose. Accordingly, Morton may not sue for any inter·
ference with its rights due to the construction of the
causeway.
B. In opposition to the Motion for Summary Judg·
ment, Morton contended:
1. The Royalty Agreement is a valid and subsisting
contract which Southern Pacific may not challenge be·
cause:
(a) Morton and its predecessors acquired a vested
water right (commonly referred to as a "diligence
right") by virtue of the fact that Morton's predecessors
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diverted water from the Great Salt Lake for the purpose
of extracting salt therefrom "at least as early as 1888."
Thus, the provision in the Royalty Agreement requiring
compliance with the Utah Water Appropriation Statutes
"where applicable" was complied with by the existence
of the diligence right.
(b) Since Morton had acquired a vested diligence
right protected by the Constitution and statutes of the
State of Utah and by the Constitution of the United
States, Morton was not required to file an application
for appropriation pursuant to §65-1-15, U.C.A. 1953,
prior to the state's entering into the Royalty Agreement.
( c) Southern Pacific not being a party to the
Royalty Agreement has no standing to raise the question
either of whether the contract was properly entered into
by the State of Utah or whether Morton is in default
under the contract.
2. The Royalty Agreement is not a license, but
whether or not it is a license, Morton is entitled to the
remedies it seeks.
3. The construction and maintenance of the causeway is not a "use of the waters" of the Great Salt Lake
for "a public purpose."
C. Southern Pacific's contention with respect to
Morton's claim of a diligence water right was that Morton does not have a valid diligence water right under
the rationale presented in Deseret Livestock Co. v. State,
110 Utah 239, 171 P.2d 401 (1946) because Morton
had no right to extract the salt from the Great Salt Lake
since under the definition of the Deseret Livestock case,

'
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such right was necessary to put the water to beneficial
use.
D. Morton contended that given the law and con.
ditions existing prior to statehood Morton's predecessors
did in fact acquire a valid and subsisting water right by
diverting water containing salt from the Great Salt Lake
into evaporation ponds just as Morton does today.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
MORTON HOLDS VALID WATER RIGHTS IN
GREAT SALT LAKE WHICH ARE PROTECTED
BY THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.

The water right held by Morton is a diligence right,
based upon an appropriation made by its predecessors
at least as early as 1888 and the continuous exercise of
the water right thereafter.
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Southern Pacific claimed that Morton did not have a valid water
right, on the theory that the appropriation lacked the
essential element of beneficial use, because Morton's
predecessors had no right to the salt at that time. It is
said that the decision in Deseret Livestock Co. v. State,
110 Utah 239, 171P.2d401 (1946), requires this result.
This part of Morton's brief will show that Deseret
Livestock is not in point, and that the water right was
validly acquired before Utah's statehood in accordance
with the territorial and federal statutes effective at
that time. The court decisions rendered contemporaneously with the acts of appropriation of Morton's prede-
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cessor establish a rule contrary to Southern Pacific's
contention. The water right is a vested right of property
entitled to the protection of the State and Federal Constitutions.
Deseret Livestock was a suit to review the State
Engineer's action on an application to appropriate waters
of Great Salt Lake. The application had been filed
shortly before (and obviously in anticipation of) enactment of the statute authorizing the Land Board to issue
agreements covering the extraction of salt from the Lake
upon the payment of royalties (Sec. 65-1-15, third para.,
U.C.A. 1953). The State Engineer approved the water
application, conditioned, however, that the applicant
show that it held a royalty agreement issued by the Land
Board as the statute provided. On review the Livestock
Company asserted that its rights under the water application predated the salt and royalty statute; that the
water right sought would include dissolved salts as a part
of the water; and that the imposition of the royalty obligation was thus an unconstitutional deprivation of vested
rights. The State Engineer's decision was affirmed by this
Court. The Court reasoned that the State owned the
Lakebed and thus the dissolved salts located upon the
Lakebed and that the Lake waters are separate and clifferent from the minerals in solution therein. The case
holds that the Livestock Company's application to the
state to divert water did not obtain for it any right to the
state's salt. The Court commented that a beneficial use
could not be made of the water applied for unless the
condition imposed by the State Engineer were observed.
The Court accurately saw the case for what it was: an
effort, notwithstanding the statute, to acquire royalty-
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free salt extraction rights under the guise of an application to appropriate water.
The Deseret Livestock case differs from the present
case both as to facts and the applicable law. As to the
facts, the cases differ in that the Livestock Company
had only a paper filing which was made some forty-three
years after statehood; in contrast, Morton holds a right
having a history of continuous diversion and use extending over nearly a century. Further, Morton has performed its agreement \vith the state to pay it salt production royalties; the Livestock Company refused to
do so.
A more basic difference lies in the laws governing
the two cases. Deseret Livestock applies the present interrelated pattern of Utah's mineral leasing statutes and
water statutes. On the other hand, the right now held by
Morton vested many years before the State of Utah came
into existence, under laws effective in the Territory in
the 1880s. A review of the development of these laws
shows the validity of plaintiff's water use under thenapplicable laws and decisions.
When the initial water diversions were made by
Morton's predecessors, the applicable federal statute (§9
of the Act of July 26, 1866; 14 Stat., 253; now 43
U.S.C. §661) 1 extended legal protection to the holder
1§9, Act of July 26, 1866, 43 USC S661:
"\Vhcnever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for
mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested
and accrued, and the same are rPcognized and acknowledged by the
local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts, the possessors
owners of such vested rights shalt be maintained and protected m
the same: and th<' right of way for the comtruction of ditches and
cana1' for the pnrposPs hcrPin specified is acknowledged and confirmed; but whr never any person, in the construction of any ditch or
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of a water right if such right was recognized by local
custom, court decision or law, and authorized rights-ofway across public lands for the utilization of such right.
Territorial legislation adopted in 1880 (Sec. 6, Ch.
XX, Laws 1880) 2 provided that water could be used
". . . for any useful purpose, such as for domestic purposes, irrigating lands, propelling machinery, washing
and sluicing ores, and other like purposes," and when so
used, the vested water right thus acquired was given
statutory protection.
The Utah Constitution expressly "confirmed and
recognized" the water rights existing under the territorial procedures (Const., Art. XVII, § 1 ) .3 Following
that pattern, the Water Filing Act of 1903 expressly
canal, injuries or damages the possession of any settler on the public
domain, the party committing such injury or damage shall be liable
to the party injured for such injury or damage.
All patents granted, or preemption or homesteads allowed, shall
be subject to any \'Csted and accrued water ri£"hts, or rights to ditches
and re,ervoirs used in connection with such water rights, as may have
been acquired under or recognized by this section."
2 Sec.

6, Ch. XX, Laws 1880:
"A right to the use of water for any useful purpose, such as
for domestic purposes, irrigating lands, propelling machinery, washing and sluicing ores, and other like purposes, is hereby recognized
and acknowledged to ha,·e vested and accrued, as a primary right, to
the extent of, and rt>asonable necessity for such use thereof, under
any of the following circumstances:
I. Whenever any person or persons shall ha\'e taken, diverted,
and med any of the unappropriated water of any natural stream,
water course, lake or spring, or other natural source of supply.
2. Whene,·er any person or persons shall have had the open,
peaceable, uninterrupted and continuous use of water for a period
of seven years."

:lSec. I, Art. XVII, Constitution of Utah:
"All existing rights to the use of any of the waters. in this State
for any useful or beneficial purpose, are hereby recognized and confirmed."
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provided that the public waters are "subject to all existing rights to the use thereof" (Sec. 4 7, Ch. 100, L. '03)
and this savings language has continued effective through
each amendment of the section down to the present similar wording of Section 73-1-1, U.C.A. 1953. The Utah
cases have routinely recognized that diligence rights are
unaffected by the Water Filing Act of 1903 and subsequent legislation and need not be evidenced by filings
with the State Engineer of the applications and proofs
required for appropriations initiated after 1903. See, e.g.,
Bishop v. Duck Creek Irr. Co., 121 Utah 290, 241 P.2d
162 ( 1952); Wellsville East Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsay
Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 P.2d 634,
rehng. den. 104 Utah 498, 143 P.2d 278 ( 1943).
The Southern Pacific apparently accepts as general
theory the validity of pre-1903 diligence rights as outlined above, but disputes Morton's right in this case on
the theory that when the diversion was made there was
no lawful right to take the salt. Southern Pacific's argument to the lower court made no reference to the law
contemporaneous with the commencement of the salt
operation to which Morton succeeded. Some review of
the laws applicable to the lands and resources in the
western states is a necessary background to an understanding of the early water cases and their application
to the facts of this case. As will appear, such review will
show that when the water diversions were commenced
by Morton's predecessors there was no federal statute
pursuant to which the dissolved salts of Great Salt Lake
could have been acquired or leased by patent or other
formal document, and there was no law which prohibited
salt extractions.
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Legislation Respecting Disposition of Salt. In 1866
the Congress adopted the first legislation which expressly authorized mining entry upon the public domain:
the Lode Law of 1866 (the Act of July 26, 1866)
( 14 Stat. 251). Beginning in 1848 and until 1866, claims
were located upon public lands and active mining had
gone forward without any legislative permission of the
federal government, the owner of the land. 1 Am. Law
of Mining, § 1.8. As is stated in Atchison v. Peterson, 87
U.S. ( 20 Wall. ) 50 7 ( 18 74) : "The government, by its
silent acquiescence, assented to the general occupation
of the lands for mining ... " By the Placer Law of 1870
(the Act of July 9, 1870; 16 Stat. 217) placer deposits
(as opposed to lodes) were made available to mining
entry (i.e., the legal steps necessary to obtain a patent).
In 1872 the two laws were combined in the General
Mining Law (Act of May 10, 1872; now 30 U.S.C.,
§21 et seq.) which, as amended, continues effective
today. Notwithstanding Congressional silence on the
subject, it soon became settled that salines and lands
containing salt springs and salt deposits were not subject
to entry under the general mining laws. Hall v. Litchfield, 2 Copp's L.O. 179 ( 1876); Utah Salt Lands, 13
Copp's L.O. 53 ( 1886) ; 2 Lindley on Mines, 3rd Ed.,
p. 1166.

The statutes authorizing the disposition of salines
and salt in the public domain evolved more slowly than
did the mining law. The first act disposing of salines,
the Saline Lands Act of 1877 (Act of January 12, 1877;
19 Stat. 221) authorized sales at public auction of saline
lands and salt springs, but the Act operated only within
those states which had received a saline land grant, and
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never became effective in Utah. 2 Lindley on Mines, 3d
Ed., §514. The Act of January 31, 1901 (31 Stat. 745)
for the first time permitted public lands containing salt
springs or deposits of salt in any form to be entered and
purchased under the laws relating to placer-mining
claims. This law was in turn displaced (as respects
sodium) by the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (now 30
U.S.C., § 181 et seq.), which provides that sodium in
the public domain is subject to disposition only by permit and lease issued by the Interior Department.
The basic Utah statute reserving and authorizing
dispositions of the State's minerals by lease was enacted
in 1919 (§1, Ch. 107, L. '19; now §65-1-15, Par. 1,
U.C.A. 1953) but it applied only to "All coal and other
minerals deposited in lands belonging to the state ... "
and thus not to salt in solution. The state statute authorizing royalty agreements covering Lake salts in solution
was enacted in 1941 (Sec. 65-1-15, Par. 3, U.C.A. 1953).
With respect to the salts of Great Salt Lake, Utah
obtained statehood in 1896, but title to the Lakebed
and minerals in solution was in doubt from statehood
on and was just recently resolved on June 6, 1971 by the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Utah v. United States,
______ U.S. ------, 91 S.Ct. 1775 ( 1971). Up until this decision it was the federal government's position that the
law of riparian ownership governed title to the Lake
bed and that thus the riparian landowners, including the
United States, owned to the "thread" of the Lake and
owned the minerals in solution in the Lake. This also had
been the position of Morton and its predecessors. While
the Court has now decided that the riparian theory of

15
ownership does not, and did not prior to statehood, apply
to the Lake, Morton's predecessors were extracting salt
with the "silent acquiescence" of the federal government, which has now been declared to have been the
owner of the Lake bed and minerals in its sovereign
capacity prior to statehood. Whether this acquiescence
was based on the now repudiated theory of riparian ownership or on the right of a pioneer to extract minerals
from the public domain, as discussed below, is immaterial
since in either event, a vested water right was created
m :Morton's predecessors prior to statehood.
Federal Legislation Stimulating Western Settlement.
During the second half of the last century many federal
laws were enacted having as a purpose the encouragement of western settlement. The pre-emption law of 1841
had authorized the purchase by a settler of up to 160
acres of government land at $1.25 per acre, but this Act
did not achieve its object of stimulating western migration. The Congress accordingly enacted the Homestead
Law of 1862 ( 12 Stat. 392) which " . . . provided for
outright transfers to settlers who complied with designated conditions relating to residence, cultivation and
use. The Homestead Law undoubtedly encouraged settlement of western lands." 1 American Law of Mining
§1.5.

Similarly, the policy of encouraging appropriation
of the mineral lands of the west was enacted into law
beginning in 1866. In fact, actual mining of federal
lands had begun with the '49ers with no authorizing
legislation, having however the "implied sanction" of the
Congress. Sparrow v. Strong, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 97
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( 1865) ; Atchison v. Peterson, supra. The Lode Law of
1866 ( § 1, 14 Stat. 251 ) confirmed the earlier mining
activity carried on without authority of federal law, and
declared that ". . . the mineral lands of the public domain, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby declared
to be free and open to exploration by all citizens of the
United States. . . . "
Congress changed its attitude from that which
existed during the 19th century, and this change has
been described by a writer as " ... a change in the role
of the United States from that of a proprietor anxious
to have its land settled, developed and improved, to that
of a rival claimant of the land." 16 Rocky Mt. L. Inst.
(1971), p. 508.
The point of the foregoing review is that the law
and the fundamental attitudes prevailing when Morton's
predecessor commenced the diversion of water at Great
Salt Lake differ from those of today, and that the validity of Morton's water right is governed by the federal
and territorial law of the 1880s. The legal situation of
the pioneer salt producer was identical, so far as concerns the absence of authorizing law, with the legal situation of the mining claimant before 1866. Even an agricultural trespasser upon the public lands could acquire
a vested water right. As is shown in the authorities,
the rule developed as a matter of evident necessity and
common sense that a use made of water in furtherance
of the water appropriator's development of public land
or resources, before formal authority of law was extended, was the basis of a valid water right. Wiel, Water
Rights in the Western States, 3rd Ed., §319; Crane v.
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Winsor, 2 Utah 248 ( 1877-1880 Terms); Patterson v.
Ryan, 37 Utah 410, 108 Pac. 1118 (1910).

A use of water in mining the public domain before
enactment of a mining statute specifically authorizing
such mining is the basis of a valid water right, and the
priority date is the time of earliest use. This is the holding of Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453 (1879), a landmark
case. In the Jennison case a mining location and a related use of water had been made by defendant's predecessor before the earliest federal legislation authorizing
the location of mining claims. Defendant's water right
was held valid and, as against plaintiff's water right, was
held to have a priority dating from the earliest act of
appropriation by defendant's predecessor. The following discussion by the Supreme Court, while lengthy, is
pertinent (98 U.S. at 457-458):
"The discovery of gold in California was followed, as is well known, by an immense immigration into the State, which increased its population
within three or four years from a few thousand
to several hundred thousand. The lands in which
the precious metals were found belonged to the
United States, and were unsurveyed, and not
open, by law, to occupation and settlement. Little
was known of them further than that they were
situated in the Sierra Nevada mountains. Into
these mountains the emigrants in vast numbers
penetrated, occupying the ravines, gulches, and
canons, and probing the earth in all directions for
the precious metals. ',Yherever they went, they
carried with them that love of order and system
and of fair dealing which are prominent characteristics of our people. In every district which they
occupied they framed certain rules for their gov-
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ernment, by which the extent of ground they
could severally hold for mining was designated,
their possessory right to such ground secured and
enforced, and contests between them either
avoided or determined.

* * *

The first appropriator was everywhere held to
have, within certain well-defined limits, a better
right than others to the claims taken up; and in
all controversies, except as against the government, he was regarded as the original owner, from
whom title was to be traced. But the mines could
not be "''orked without water. \'\Tithout water the
gold would remain forever buried in the earth
or rock. To carry water to mining localities, when
they were not on the banks of a stream or lake,
became, therefore, an important and necessary
business in carrying on mining. Here, also, the
first appropriator of water to be conveyed to such
localities for mining or other beneficial purposes,
was recognized as having, to the extent of actual
use, the better right. The doctrines of the common law respecting the rights of riparian owners
were not considered as applicable, or only in a
very limited degree, to condition of miners in the
mountains. The waters of rivers and lakes were,
consequently, carried great distances in ditches
and flumes, constructed with vast labor and
enormous expenditures of money, along the sides
of mountains and through canons and ravines, to
supply communities engaged in mining, as well
as for agriculturists and ordinary consumption.
Numerous regulations were adopted, or assumed
to exist, from their obvious justness, for the security of these ditches and flumes, and the protection of rights to water, not only between
different appropriators, but between them and the

19

holders of mining claims. These regulations and
customs were appealed to in controversies in the
state courts, and received their sanction; and
properties to the value of many millions rested
upon them. For eighteen years, from 1848 to
1866, the regulations and customs of miners, as
enforced and moulded by the courts and sanctioned by the legislation of the State, constituted
the law governing property in mines and in water
on the public minerals lands. Until 1866, no legislation was had looking to a sale of the mineral
lands."
While the early miners may have been acting without express legislative authority, their utilization of the
resources and lands of the public domain, and the uses
of water necessarily related to their activities, was fully
in accord with the government's policy of encouragement of the western settlement. The Southern Pacific's
argument that the extraction of salt was unlawful is
more than misleading, it is wrong because it suggests
that there was some law which forbade the extraction
of salt from the waters of Great Salt Lake. There was
no such law.
As the foregoing summary demonstrates, the law
with respect to the acquisition of a water right in connection with the extraction of salt from the public
domain prior to statehood was different from that applied in the Deseret Livestock case. The latter case defined interrelated state statutes and did not deal with
vested water rights acquired prior to statehood. Accordingly, it may not be applied to deprive an appropriator
under the applicable federal law prior to statehood of
a vested water right acquired thereunder. To so construe
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and apply the Deseret Livestock case '>vould result in an
unconstitutional deprivation of Morton's vested rights
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
The water rights acquired by Morton's predecessors during territorial times in accordance with the prevailing laws were vested rights and were confirmed and
recognized by the Utah Constitution. Morton succeeded
to these rights by the transfers of the properties to it.
Sec. 60, Chap. 100, Laws, 1903; Sec. 73-1-11, U.C.A.,
1953.
As is observed in 1 Clark, Waters and Water Rights,

p. 83:

" ... it is appropriate to note that each valid
right to the use of water is a real-property right,
under the protective aegis of f ecleral and state constitutional guarantees which prohibit the deprivation of private property without due process of
law.
Whatever may be the effect of water doctrinal restraints on free transfers of water rights in
a given area, this fact stands out clearly: the Fifth
Amendment was added to the United States Constitution at the beginning of national history, and
the Fourteenth Amendment was added in 1868;
therefore, every subsequent statute, court decision,
or acquired right of appropriation carried \vith
it this fundamental constitutional inhibition regarding due process-an inhibition which applies
to rights in land and other property as well as
in water."
Based on all of the foregoing, Morton's water rights
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are rights of property which vested before this state
came into existence. The Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution would have extended protection to such a water right against any act of the new
state or any person claiming under the state. However,
as is shown above, from the outset the state explicitly recognized such rights, and the pattern of its laws has been
so designed. Southern Pacific cannot be permitted to
damage or harm such rights as it may choose.
POINT II.
MORTON'S ROYALTY AGREEMENT WITH THE
STATE IS A VALID AND SUBSISTING CONTRACT
WHICH GIVES MORTON VALID RIGHTS TO EXTRACT SALT FROM THE GREAT SALT LAKE.

The record shows that for many years Morton has
produced salt from Lake brines under a Royalty Agreement made with the State Land Board, and that the
present operation is based thereon. The agreement, which
is part of the record (R 206-212), recognizes Morton's
continuing right to process Lake waters for the removal
of salt and requires Morton to pay an annual minimum
royalty, in advance, and a production royalty at the
standard rate, to be remitted quarterly.
The Southern Pacific argued to the lower court in
Section III of its Memorandum in support of its Motion
for Summary Judgment:
"It follows that even if Morton could show
it has the right to appropriate water from the
Lake, which defendant asserts it cannot do, it
would still have to have a right to remove the salt
granted to it by the State of Utah in order to
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maintain the instant action." ( R 234)

* *

-!(-

''Morton's reliance upon the September 17,
1954, Agreement is equally devoid of any effect,
inasmuch as Morton has admitted that it has no
water appropriation application on file with the
Utah State Engineer, and also that it has no water
appropriation certificate. Inasmuch as paragraph
2 of said Agreement specifically states that a prerequisite to the effectiveness of the Agreement is
that Morton comply with Title 73, Utah Code
Annotated ( 1953), which governs the methods
by which parties may obtain the right to appropriate water from the Lake, and Morton has admitted it has not submitted an application to or
received a certificate from, the State Engineer,
it follows that said Agreement is and has been
totally inoperative." (R 235)

* * *

"Morton has admitted that neither it nor its
predecessor [sic] have ever filed an application
for a water appropriation certificate with the
State Engineer; therefore it is clear that the
State Land Board could not and in fact did not
comply with the statutory mandate in Section
65-1-15 set forth above, and that therefore the
Agreement of September 17, 1954, upon which
Morton relies to sustain its allegation that it has
a right to remove sodium chloride from the waters
of the Lake is void and of no effect whatsoever."
(R 236)

In other words, so this circular argument goes, assuming Morton has an appropriation right, it has no
right to extract salt under the Royalty Agreement since
it has not filed an application to appropriate water and

'
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received an appropriation certificate as required by the
agreement and the statute. This can only be characterized as a "bootstrap" approach.
It is submitted that the language of the Royalty
Agreement 4 means only that Morton agrees to comply
with those provisions of Title 73 which apply to its
situation. As is shown in Point I, Morton holds a diligence right to use Lake waters bearing a priority date
at least as early as 1888. Thus, it is clear that the Royalty
Agreement does not require Morton to file an application because Title 73 does not require such a filing of a
diligence rights owner.
As to the statutory argument, it is apparent from
the wording of the agreement that the State Land Board
correctly read paragraph 3 of Section 65-1-15 5 to mean
that the owner of a diligence water right need not file
an application to appropriate water in order to enter
into a royalty agreement to extract salt from the Great
Salt Lake.
""For and during the term of this agreement, Morton shall have the
continuing right to appropriate, remove and divert water of and from
Great Salt Lake for the purpose of extracting salt therefrom; provided,
hn\\'evcr, that this a.grerment shall not be construed to relieve Morton from
full compliance with Title 73, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, relative to
applications for the divenion and appropriation of the waters of the
State of Utah, where said statutes are applicable." (Royalty Agreement,
Paragraph 2, R 207)
'•"Salts and other minerals in the waters of navigable lakes and streams
arc likewise reserved to th<> state and shall be sold by the state land board
nnly upon royalty basis. The amount of such royalties and the terms of
s11ch contracts shall be determined by the board; provided, that all such
<«l!1tracts shall be subject to the use of the waters for public purposes, and
provided further that before executing a contract which contemplates the
rrcnwry of salb and minerals from said waters, the state land board shall
n·ciuirc evidence that an application for the appropriation of waters for
"tch purpn'l' has bC'en fikd with the State Engineer and is pending in
his office."
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The sensible construction of the legislative intention
of Section 65-1-15 and of the parallel special water statute adopted at the same time (Sec. 73-3-8, U.C.A. 1953)
is that salt extractions from Great Salt Lake should
comply with Land Board supervision so far as concerns
the mining and royalty aspect of the operation and that
the related water use should be carried on in accordance
with the applicable provisions of the water code which
govern water uses generally.
The State Land Board's construction of the third
paragraph of Section 65-1-15 is entitled to substantial
deference. The statutes of Utah commit to that state
agency a broad supervision of the state's land and mineral disposition program. A recent U.S. Supreme Court
decision, Investment Company Institute v. Camp, ---··U.S. ______ , 91S.Ct.1091 (1971), states the principle of
administrative law applicable generally to such situations,
as follows:
"But we cannot come lightly to the conclusion
that the Comptroller has authorized activity
which violates the banking laws. It is settled that
courts should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted
by the agency charged with the enforcement of
that statute. The Comptroller of the Currency is
charged with the enforcement of the banking laws
to an extent that warrants the invocation of this
principle with respect to his deliberative conc.lusions as to the meaning of these laws. See First
National Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 658, 44
S.Ct. 213, 215, 68 L.Ed. 486, 493." (91 S.Ct. at
1097)

See also 82 C.J.S., Statutes §359 ( 1953).
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If Section 65-1-15 were construed and applied to
Morton as Southern Pacific urges, the legislation would
violate the state constitution (Art. I, §6, due process; Art.
XVII, § 1, water rights) and the United States Constitution (14th Amendment). It is a cardinal, or the basic,
rule of construction, that when reasonably possible, and
within the bounds of legitimate construction and legislative intent, statutes should be so construed as to uphold,
and avoid doubts as to, their constitutionality. 16 C.J.S.,
Constitutional Law, §98b ( 1956). When the statute was
enacted Morton held a diligence water right, vested in a
constitutional sense. A basic element of the doctrine
of prior appropriation of water is that priority of use
results in priority of right. Property rights in water consist not alone in the amount of the appropriation, but, also
in the priority of the appropriation. Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 154 P.2d 748 (1944) (quoting
other sources with approval in cases involving priorities).
Plaintiff's water right is valuable because it was obtained
at such an early date. If the Utah statute or Land Board
regulatory procedures thereunder were to operate to
compel Morton to surrender this very early priority of
right and to incur the expense and uncertainty of the
filing of a new water application (with the related publication of notice and the submission of engineering proofs
and the other matters involved), and thereafter at best
to obtain a water right junior in priority to the rights of
other appropriators, the result would be the deprivation
of property without due process of law. Further, a compulsion upon Morton to surrender its priority date would
be to treat its diligence right (for mining) on a different
basis from the treatment accorded diligence rights held
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by other pioneer water users for other purposes, such as
irrigation or culinary purposes. Such a treatment would
be a denial of the equal protection of the laws which is
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
Southern Pacific has also asserted that the State
of Utah has given notice to Morton of a claimed
default under the agreement by virtue of a counterclaim filed in a lawsuit pending in United States District Court for the District of Utah entitled Morton
International v. State of Utah, Civil No. C-127-66.
This case involves the same issues with respect to the
ownership of the lake and the relicited lands as are involved in Utah v. United States, No. 31, Original. The
so-called "notice" relied upon by Southern Pacific does
not purport to be a notice, and the procedural steps of
mailing or service, and specification of a termination
date, which are required by the Royalty Agreement for
such purpose ( R. 209, 210) have not been taken. The
obvious reason is that the pleading was never meant to
be a notice of default. In any event, Southern Pacific's
argument is defeated by the fact that the State's pleading, one portion of which has been singled out by defendant as constituting "notice of clefau lt," also contains the
contention by the State (Thirteenth Defense, R. 104)
that l'vforton must treat the Royalty Agreement as binding because it is estopped to do otherwise. It is of course,
a more fundamental consideration than all of the foregoing that there has been no default whatever and that
the Royalty Agreement is lawful, effective and being perfom1cd in accordance with its terns.
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POINT III.
SOUTHERN PACIFIC, NOT BEING A PARTY TO
THE ROY AL TY AGREEMENT, HAS NO STANDING TO CLAIM EITHER THAT THE CONTRACT
IS ILLEGAL, OR THAT MORTON IS IN DEFAULT
THEREUNDER.

Southern Pacific contended below that the Royalty
Agreement was "void" or "invalid" because Morton had
not filed an application with the State Engineer, and
thus the State Land Board could not and did not comply
with the statutory mandate in Section 65-1-15 (see Footnote 4, p. 23). Morton contends that even if the agreement were void or invalid as against public policy, i.e.,
illegal, which it is not, a third person has no standing to
assert such ground as a defense where neither party has
sought to avoid it. Faus v. Pacific R.R. Co., 146 Cal.App.
2d 370, 303 P.2d 814 (1956); Mathias v. Dickerson, 179
Kan. 739, 298 P.2d 219 ( 1956); Newcomb v. Ingram,
211 Wis. 88, 248 N.W. 171 ( 1933). 17 C.J.S. Contracts,
§283 ( 1963).
Furthermore, Southern Pacific also contended that
the agreement was inoperative because paragraph 2
thereof "specifically states that a prerequisite to the
effcctiveness of the agreement is that Morton comply
with Title 73" and it has not so complied. There is no
such language in paragraph 2. Even assuming, which is
not the case, that Morton had not complied with the
agreement, Southern Pacific, a third person, has no standing to assert Morton's lack of performance in defense of
Southern Pacific's wrongful acts.
The Southern Pacific stated that Morton was requesting the court below to recognize and endorse an
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unauthorized, ineffective and invalid agreement which
the law would not allmv. In support of this position the
Southern Pacific cited the following cases: Oscanyan v.
Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 ( 1880); Linn v. ULA Uranium
Inc., 163 F. Supp. 245 (D. Utah 1958); aff'd., 265
F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1959); Schur v. Johnson, 2 Cal.App.
2d 680, 38 P.2d 844 ( 1934); Lewis v. Jackson & Squire,
86 F.Supp. 354 (W.D. Ark. 1949); appeal dismissed 181
F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1950); Van Norden v. Metson, 75
Cal.App.2d 595, 171 P.2d 485 (1946); Conte v. Busby,
115 Cal.App.732, 2 P.2d 458 ( 1931); Lee On v. Long, 37
Cal.App.2d 499, 234 P.2d 9 ( 1951).
These cases concerned respectively, ( 1) a suit to enforce a bribe, ( 2) a suit to enforce a contract tantamount
to a bribe, ( 3) an action to recover monies seized in a
gambling raid, ( 4) a suit to enforce an illegal union shop
agreement, ( 5) a suit brought by a witness for a contingent fee based upon the recovery in the suit in which he
testified, ( 6) a suit on a draft given for consideration in
the purchase of a house of prostitution, and ( 7) an action
to recover money seized on gambling tables.
These cases hold, and rightly so, that contracts concerning criminal and immoral activities will not be enforced by the courts and can be attacked by third parties. The agreement between Morton and the Utah State
Land Board does not involve any criminal or immoral
activities. Consequently, the Southern Pacific as a third
party has no standing to assert that the Royalty Agreemen is void, invalid or inoperative, and this agreement
must be held to be valid and enforceable.
The Southern Pacific has cited the following Ian-
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guage in the Faus case, supra: "The defense of illegality,
although open to the parties and those claiming under
them, cannot as a general rule be invoked by third persons." ( 303 P. 2d at 820), for the proposition that as
Southern Pacific is claiming title under the Grant of
Easement from the state, it is claiming under the state,
which is a party to the Royalty Agreement, and can,
therefore, assert the defense of illegality. The language
"and those claiming under them" refers to parties having an interest in the particular contract and cannot be
given the strained interpretation which the Southern Pacific suggests. Stolz-Wicks, Inc. v. Commercial Television Service Co., 271 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1959). Morton
is not attacking the validity of the easement granted by
the State to the Southern Pacific, and the Southern
Pacific holds no interest under the State in the Royalty
Agreement. Thus Southern Pacific has no standing to
challenge the legality of the agreement.
POINT IV.
MORTON'S RIGHTS TO EXTRACT SALT FROM
THE GREAT SALT LAKE ARE ENTITLED TO
LEGAL PROTECTION FROM INTERFERENCE BY
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CAUSEWAY.

Southern Pacific contended in the lower court that,
assuming the validity of Morton's Royalty Agreement,
Morton nevertheless has no cause of action. Southern
Pacific argued, at considerable length, that Morton is a
mere licensee rather than a lessee under the agreement
and thus has no "proprietary interest" in the salt in the
water of the Lake. Therefore, assuming the truth of
Morton's allegations that Southern Pacific's causeway
has interfered with Morton's rights to extract and pro-
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duce salt, for which Morton seeks damages and injunctive
relief to prevent the loss of its multi-million dollar salt
extraction business at the Lake, Southern Pacific argues
that Morton has no remedy against Southern Pacific "in
contract, tort or othenvise for anything done which effects
[sic] the salt in the Lake until after it has extracted the
salt from the water and reduces it to its possession ... "
( R 24 7) . As stated by the Southern Pacific in oral argument (R 372-3):
"What we're saying, it wouldn't make any
difference if we took all of the salt, if we physically had the ability to take all of the salt out of
that lake, they don't have any standing, period."
In other words, Southern Pacific can do anything to
obstruct or interfere with Morton's salt extraction operations, and Morton only has a remedy at such time as
Southern Pacific damages or removes its pile of harvested
salt. This is an amazing conclusion to reach under
Anglo-American jurisprudence and it is not the law in
any state.
Having affixed the label of license to the Royalty
Agreement, Southern Pacific then relies primarily on
two cases, Caledonian Coal Co. v. Rocky Cliff Coal Mining Co., 16 N.M. 517, 120 Pac. 715 (1911) and Von
Goerlitz v. Turner, 65 Cal. App. 2nd 475, 150 P.2d 278
( 1944), to show that Morton, as a licensee, has no remedy
for the alleged interference with its operations. Actually,
as will be demonstrated below, neither of these cases supports this position.
We submit, however, that an accurate analysis of
this case cannot be made by the superficial process of
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hunting for labels. In its decision in Haynes v. Hunt, 96
Utah 348, 85 P.2d 861 ( 1939) this Court stated, in a
similar context (page 354) :
"Having concluded that the deed evidences
a grant of an interest or estate and not a mere
license, it becomes necessary to determine the
nature or extent of the interest granted, that is,
whether it is personal or inheritable and assignable. Plaintiff argues that if an estate is granted
it is at most only an easement in gross, which is
personal and not inheritable, while respondent
contends it is a profit a prendre and passes to the
heirs and assigns. We are not interested in the
use of terms but we are in concepts, relationships
and legal rights which for convenience are often
described by the use of legal names or expressions.''

See also Kennedy, et al v. Combined Metals Reduction
Company, 87 Utah 532, 51P.2d1064 (1935).
The agreement has an initial term of 20 years, subject to Morton's right of renewal for so long as salt extracting operations are carried on, and it is not revocable
by the state. While the language of the grants in the
agreement are similar to those normally provided in a
lease, if it is not a lease, it falls within the definition of
a profit a prendre, 6 a profit in gross 7 or an incorporeal
hereditament. 8
•lTiffany, Real Property (3rd ed. 1939), §839.
"A profit a prendre involves primarily a power to acquire, by
severance or removal from another's land, some thing or things previously constituting a part of the land, or appertaining thereto, the
holder of a profit a prendre having, as an integral part thereof, rights
against the members of the community generally that they shall not
interfere with the exercise or enjoyment of the power."
'Tiffany, supra, §843.
KTiffany. supra, §846.
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The instrument under which Morton claims clearly
creates an interest in realty. It is true the interest is distinguishable from a deed or a contract granting rights
in fixed resources, such as hard minerals, which are in
land. The interest created is also distinguishable from a
contract which simply creates a revocable license in land
or in a severed mineral interest. The instrument has two
distinct and unusual characteristics: 1 ) it grants a right
in a fugitive, migrating mineral (salt) in solution, and
2) it grants an irrevocable right to extract the salt which
is of indefinite duration, depending only on Morton's
continued production and payment of royalties. This
latter characteristic, while furnishing a basis for analogy
to oil and gas law, hereafter discussed, also brings the
agreement within the scope of the traditional definition
of a profit a prendre. A profit a prendre is an interest
in realty. Deseret Livestock Co. v. Sharp, 123 Utah 353,
259 P.2d 607 ( 1953).
That the characteristics of the agreement are unusual is not surprising. They arise out of the practicalities
of the Land Board's management of a state-owned resource which is virtually unique. The agreement reflects
the necessities of balancing the interests of the owner
(the state) and the various producers, including Morton, involved in the Lake minerals extraction industry.
Although the situation is admittedly a special one, the
applicable law may be readily determined by analogy to
the law of oil and gas.
The physical fluid characteristics of oil and gas are
similar to minerals in solution in water. As in the case of
the Royalty Agreement, the term of an oil and gas lease
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is typically indefinite, enduring so long as production
continues. The general rule is that the leasehold interest
under an oil and gas lease is realty. Sullivan, Handbook
on Oil and Gas, Sec. 27, and the rule in Utah is that
the interest is real property. Chase v. Morgan, 9 Utah
2d 125, 339 P.2d 1019 ( 1959). Where a number of leases
cover a single pool, each lessee has rights and duties correlative with those of other lessees, and these extend
throughout the pool or common source of supply. The
doctrine was enunciated in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177
U.S. 190, 20 S.Ct. 576, 44 L.Ed. 729 ( 1900) and is now
widely accepted. 4 A.L.R. 2d 198. The concept of correlative rights in oil and gas pools is adopted by statute
in Utah. §40-6-1, U.C.A. 1953.
Thus it is submitted that Morton's rights under the
Royalty Agreement are rights of real property, extending
throughout the Lake, and that damage to such rights
anywhere in the Lake is actionable.
In any event, one thing is clear and that is that
Morton does not have a license within the meaning of
the authorities cited by the Southern Pacific. It is the
power of revocation by the grantor at any time which
characterizes the cases cited by Southern Pacific in its
memoranda below, e.g., Combined Metals Reduction Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 101 Utah 230, 116 P.2d 929
( 1940) (terminable upon 30 days notice) ; Von Goerlitz
case, supra, ("Inasmuch as the agreement was a license
to operate the mine it was revocable at the will of the
defendants." 150 P.2d at 280)

Both of the quotations from Tiffany, Real Property,
3rd ed. §829, page 403 (R 246) and §840, page 430 (R
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311) presented by Southern Pacific below are only partial quotations; in each case the sentence immediately
following the quoted language makes clear that the author had reference to a revocable license:
"That he has no right of action against the
landowner himself by reason of such an obstruction by the latter follows from the doctrine that a
license is revocable and may be revoked by an act
on the part of a licensor indicating an intention
to revoke." [Tiffany, Real Property, 3rd ed. 1939)
§829, page 403] (emphasis added)
"It is as a result, it seems, of the absence of
any duty on the part of the landowner to refrain
from interference with the exercise of the license
privilege that the license is revocable at the pleasure of the licensor." [Tiffany, Real Property, 3rd
ed. 1939) §840, page 430] (emphasis added)
A standard definition of a license as set out in 25 Am.

Jur. 2d, Easements and Licenses, § 123, is:

"A license in real property is defined as a personal, revocable, and unassignable privilege, conferred either by writing or parol, to do one or
more acts on land without possessing any interest
therein."
Accordingly, it is evident that, whatever may be the
most accurate legal name for Morton's interest under
the agreement, it is not a license as that term is defined
in these texts and in the cases cited by Southern Pacific.
Even if Morton were a licensee, however, it clearly
has the right to protect itself against interference or
obstruction of the exercise of such license by a third person. The two cases relied on by Southern Pacific below,
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Caledonian Coal Co. v. Rocky Cliff Coal Mining Co.,
supra, and Von Goerlitz v. Turner, supra, actually support Morton's right of recovery. The Caledonian case
involved an action for trespass to land in which it was
alleged that the defendants had entered upon certain
land, to the possession of which plaintiff was lawfully
entitled, and that the defendants had mined and extracted certain quantities of coal which they converted
to their own use. The court stated:

" ... the railroad company granted nothing
more than a license to the plaintiffs to mine coal
from the land, and did not grant plaintiff any
property in the coal until it had mined it. As long
as the coal remained in place, it was the property
of the railroad company. [Citations omitted] The
plaintiff could not recover damages on the theory
that it had title to the coal. No doubt, as was said
in Baker v. Hart, supra, [ 123 N.Y. 470, 25 N.E.
948 ( 1890)] the act of the defendants was an infringement of plaintiff's rights, for which it could
recover damages as it in fact sustained; but it
proved none." (120 Pac. at 718). (emphasis
added)
Von Goerlitz involved an action in claim and delivery for possession of certain chrome. The court held
that under such cause of action it was essential for plaintiff to establish possession of the property, and as he was
unable to do so, his complaint and the evidence in support thereof were fatally defective. The court said that
plaintiff's proof must be in accordance with the form of
action. However, the court did not foreclose the right
of plaintiff to have initiated a different cause of action
and thereby recover against the defendant. Obviously,
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these cases relate to the particular form of action involved
therein and do not support the Southern Pacific.
Morton is seeking damages and an injunction against
the Southern Pacific for interference with its rights to
extract salt from the Lake and even a licensee is entitled
to such remedies. Case v. Weber, 2 Ind. 108 ( 1850);
Union Petroleum Co. v. Bliven Petroleum Co., 72 Pa.
173 (1872); Paul v. Hazelton, 37 N.J.L. 106 (1874);
Miller v. Inhabitants of Greenwich Township, 62 N.J.L.
711, 42 A. 735 (1899); Mounsville Water Co. v.
Moundsville Sands Co., 124 W.Va. 118, 19 S.E. 2d 217
( 1942); Bell Telephone Co. v. Baltimore & O.R. Co.,
155 Pa. Super. 286, 38 A.2d 732 ( 1944); Nahas v. Local
905, Retail Clerks International Association, 144 Cal.
App. 2d 808, 302 P.2d 829 ( 1956); Lucky Auto Supply
v. Turner, 244 Cal. App. 2d 872, 53 Cal. Rptr. 628
( 1966); In re Primary Road No. Iowa 144 v. Iowa State
Highway Commission, 253 Iowa 1130, 114 N.W.2d 290
(1962). See also Annotation: 139 A.L.R. 1207.
Southern Pacific sought to distinguish the foregoing
cases on the ground that under the agreement Morton
has no right to possession of the salt in the Lake and that
the agreement merely gives Morton the right to purchase
salt from the state. This argument is so patently without
merit that it is sufficient merely to state that the agreement is obviously not a purchase contract, and that
Morton is not purchasing salt from the state but is paying a royalty for the exercise of its right to possess the
salt.
In its Reply Memorandum and oral argument below
Southern Pacific sought to ignore the criterion of revoca-
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bility, which characterizes the license.-> in the authorities
cited, and stressed the fact that under the Royalty Agreemen Morton does not have an exclusive right to extract
salt from the Lake. Since Morton's right is not exclusive,
so the argument goes, it has no remedy against another
person \vho extracts salt from the Lake, even if such person removes all of the salt from the Lake. This argument
is also without merit, however, as respects the Southern
Pacific since it pre-supposes that Southern Pacific has
a valid right granted by the State to extract salt from
the Lake which, of course, it does not have. The fact
that Morton's rights are not exclusive does not mean that
a third person without any such rights can, with impunity, dam up and obstruct Morton's source of supply.
The effect of a decision to the contrary would be unconsionable.
POINT V.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CAUSEWAY IS
NOT A "USE OF THE WATERS [OF THE GREAT
SALT LAKE] FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES."

Southern Pacific argued to the court below that
Morton's rights under the Royalty Agreement are subject to the effects of the causeway. The argument is based
upon the italicized portion of the third paragraph of
Section 65-1-15, U.C.A. 1953, quoted below:
"Salts and other minerals in the waters of
navigable lakes and streams are likewise reserved
to the state and shall be sold by the state land
board only upon royalty basis. The amount of such
royalties and the terms of such contracts shall be
determined by the board; provided, that all such
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contracts shall be subject to the use of the waters
for public purposes . . . ."

It is Southern Pacific's position that since the railroad
company is a public utility, its construction and maintenance of the causeway across the Lake is a "use of the
waters for public purposes."
It is submitted that the language relied upon by
Southern Pacific does not say what is claimed for it. The
normal reading of the language would be that a minerals
extraction contract is subject to the use by the public
of the Lake waters as such. The construction and maintenance of the causeway is obviously not a use of Lake
waters. It is a rule of statutory construction that the
words of a statute are to be given their usual and commonly understood meaning. 82 C.J.S. Statutes, §329 (b)
( 1953). If the legislature had intended that all royalty
contracts were to be made subject to the condition that
a utility company having an easement in the bed of the
Lake were free, without liability, to damage a contract
holder, it would have been easy to say so. Indeed, the
idea is so novel that express words to that effect would
have been required. The statute does not purport to
grant immunity for tort or nuisance.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted
that the judgment entered by the trial court should be
reversed and the case remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted,
Hardin A. Whitney
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